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ABSTRACT
Various interorganizational systems (IOS) such as Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) 
and Supply Chain Management Systems (SCMS) have attracted significant attention among 
information system (IS) researchers. However, IS scholars have taken less interest in Online 
Reverse Auctions (ORAs), a widely used IOS in online business-to-business transactions. 
This study examines the factors that enable and/or inhibit ORA use from the perspective 
of buyers and suppliers, as well as the potential role of the institutional context based on a 
case study of a French retailer. Building on 122 semi-structured interviews collected in two 
stages with various stakeholders from the interorganizational community (buyers, suppliers 
and technology initiators), we demonstrate the extent to which the determinants of ORA 
use differ between buyers and suppliers (e.g. perceived outcomes, capabilities required to 
use ORAs). We then show how a change in the institutional context not only failed to 
redress distrust between buyers and suppliers, but also created new barriers to ORA use 
by introducing controls and sanctions that outweighed the economic benefits of ORA use 
among buyers. We contribute to the IS literature by demonstrating the role of strategic 
capabilities in shaping use. While the IS literature acknowledges the institutional context as 
a determinant of use, little is known about the extent to which a change in the institutional 
context may affect ORA use. Our research shows the extent to which legislation can trigger 
IT discontinuance because of the perceived risk introduced. 
Keywords: Online Reverse Auctions, use, enablers, barriers, legislation, risk of control 
and sanctions.
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RÉSUMÉ
En dépit de l’intérêt croissant des chercheurs SI aux systèmes inter-organisationnels tels 
que l’échange de données électronique (EDI) et les systèmes de gestion de la chaîne logistique 
(SGCL), peu de recherches se sont intéressées aux enchères électroniques inversées (EEI), 
un système d’information inter-organisationnel largement utilisé dans les transactions 
électroniques inter-firmes. 
Cette étude a pour objectif de mettre en évidence les déterminants d’usage des EEI suivant 
la perspective des acheteurs et celle des fournisseurs ainsi que le rôle potentiel du contexte 
institutionnel à travers une étude de cas réalisée auprès d’un distributeur français. Nous 
avons mené 122 entretiens semi-directifs en deux phases auprès des différents membres 
de la communauté inter-organisationnelle (acheteurs, fournisseurs et les initiateurs de 
la technologie) concernés par l’utilisation des EEI. Nos résultats mettent en évidence des 
différences entre les acheteurs et les fournisseurs quant à leurs déterminants d’usage. 
Nous montrons ensuite comment un changement du contexte institutionnel peut impacter 
l’usage des EEI. En effet, alors que la loi n’a pas permis de remédier au climat de méfiance 
qui prévaut entre acheteurs et fournisseurs, elle a créé de nouvelles barrières à l’usage 
pour les acheteurs. Plus particulièrement, les risques de contrôle et de sanction introduits 
par la loi sont à l’origine de nouvelles barrières à l’utilisation des EEI pour les acheteurs. 
Nous contribuons à la littérature SI en montrant le rôle des capacités organisationnelles à 
influencer l’usage. Alors que le rôle déterminant du contexte institutionnel pour expliquer 
l’usage a été largement reconnu dans la littérature SI, notre compréhension de l’impact du 
changement du contexte institutionnel sur les déterminants de l’usage est encore limitée. 
Nous mettons en évidence l’étendue à laquelle la loi peut être à l’origine de la discontinuité 
d’usage à cause du risque perçu qu’elle introduit.
Mots-clés : Enchères électroniques inversées, utilisation, facteurs favorisant l’usage, 




ships are crucial to organizational perfor-
mance (Gulati and Sytch, 2007; Palmatier 
et al, 2007; Chaparro-Pelaez et al., 2014). 
In order to build and maintain success-
ful relationships with trading partners in 
areas such as procurement and supply 
chain management, firms increasingly 
rely on interorganizational systems (IOS). 
Gartner points to the heavy investment in 
IT (up to $3.7 trillion), including US $296 
billion for IOS such as electronic data in-
terchange (EDI) and supply chain man-
agement systems (SCMS). This illustrates 
the degree to which IOS use by trading 
partners has become a critical require-
ment for business operations (Iacovou 
et al., 1995; Mukhopadhyay et al., 1995; 
Wang, 2014; Reimers, Johnston and Klein, 
2014). 
Today, firms are using IOS to improve 
their purchasing performance (Cousins 
and Spekman, 2003; Ellram, 1996). IOS 
help firms to compare supplier prices, 
assess alternative supply sources, negoti-
ate better contracts (Johnston and Vitale, 
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1988) and benchmark suppliers (Rig-
gins and Mukhopadhyay, 1994), which 
explains business organizations’ willing-
ness to invest heavily in this area (Meier, 
1995). Among such IOS, Online Reverse 
Auctions (ORAs) have become a popu-
lar basis for conducting business trans-
actions in numerous industries such as 
retail (Hawkins et al., 2014, Jap, 2007). 
Its role in improving the procurement 
process has been acknowledged in many 
organizations (Standing et al., 2013). The 
process is considered “as the interface be-
tween an organization and its suppliers” 
(Rai et al., 2008, p.336). ORAs support the 
negotiation process within inter-organiza-
tional relationships (Jap & Haruvy, 2008) 
and viewed as an IOS (da Silveira and Cag-
liano, 2006; Charki et al., 2011)
Online reverse auctions are an aspect 
of the trading platforms hosted by virtual 
market makers that provide the tech-
nological infrastructure and platforms 
needed to handle supply and demand 
(Pinker et al., 2003). Consequently, in 
contrast to offline auctions, transactions 
made through online auctions are not 
dyadic but are triadic in nature between 
a buying firm and preselected suppliers. 
For Smart and Harisson (2003) “Online 
reverse auctions (ORAs) are exactly the 
way they sound: traditional auctions 
in Reverse. Instead of a seller offering a 
product for sale to the highest bidder, a 
buyer offers a tender or contract for the 
supply of specific goods or services. Sup-
pliers compete for the right to the con-
tract by bidding reducing prices, until a 
final price – the lowest – brings the auc-
tion to an end” (p. 257).  
ORAs are widely used by the procure-
ment organizations of many Fortune 
Global 2000 corporations (Giampietro 
and Emiliani, 2007) and government 
agencies (Ivory, 2014) to source a variety 
of goods and services. Firms such as Dell, 
GE, GlaxoSmithKline, the Formosa Group 
and HP encourage their suppliers to com-
pete for purchase orders through ORAs 
(Chang, 2007) which account for around 
10 to 15 percent of total corporate pur-
chasing expenditure (Emiliani and Stec 
2005). According to the Institute for Sup-
ply Management and Forrester Research 
(2013),1 85% of companies surveyed de-
clared they had shifted towards e-sourc-
ing tools such as ORAs to procure their 
suppliers’ services. 
At the same time, despite their grow-
ing use, ORAs have received little atten-
tion from IOS researchers and little is 
known about the determinants of their 
use (Mithas et al., 2008). Most IOS studies 
have focused on either the buyer or the 
supplier side (Venkatesh and Bala, 2008) 
and so little is known about the factors 
affecting the different firms engaged in 
IOS use. Moreover, few studies have in-
vestigated the interorganizational context 
of IOS use (Kurnia and Johnston, 2000; 
Rodon et al., 2011) or the extent to which 
a change in this context can impact on 
use (Kurnia and Johnston, 2000). Given 
all this, our paper poses the following 
research question: What are the determi-
nants of ORA use from the vantage point 
of buyers and suppliers and how can a 
change in the institutional context affect 
such use? 
In order to answer our research ques-
tion, we conducted a large-scale qualita-
tive case study in two stages, separated 
by one major institutional change. Dur-
ing the first stage, our goal was to gain 
insights into the enablers and barriers to 
the use of this type of IOS. Subsequently, 
1 http://www.procureport.com/news_aug_28_2013.html 
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as the institutional context of ORA use 
evolved, we were keen to understand 
the implications of such changes with re-
gard to use. We therefore conducted 122 
semi-structured interviews across the two 
phases of our study over a 3-year period 
with the main stakeholders of the interor-
ganizational community interested in the 
IOS of online reverse auction technology.
Our findings suggest that determinants 
of use differ between buyers and suppli-
ers, and that the new institutional con-
text may influence these determinants. 
We demonstrate that the new law fails 
to promote the use of ORAs by suppliers 
since it does not redress the prevailing 
climate of distrust between buyers and 
suppliers caused by the opportunistic 
practices previously adopted by some 
buyers. However, unexpectedly, the new 
law appears to have created new barriers 
due to the additional complexity of ORA 
use. Our results have diverse implications 
for both researchers and practitioners. We 
highlight the extent to which focusing on 
a specific firm can give a partial under-
standing of IOS use. We also show that 
determinants of use are not static but may 
vary following a change in the context of 
use. From a managerial perspective, we 
illustrate the extent to which an interven-
tion that aims to regulate use can impact 
on the determinants of use and even cre-
ate new barriers. 
Our article is organized as follows. First, 
we review the existing literature on IT use 
with a focus on the determinants of ORA 
use. The review showed that this form of 
IOS has largely been covered in terms of 
perceived outcomes (enablers and barri-
ers), while the role of organizational capa-
bilities tends to have been ignored in ex-
plaining usage. Moreover, most research 
does not take the institutional context in 
which IOS use is embedded into account, 
which limits our understanding of the 
determinants of use following a change 
in the context. Second, we show the ex-
tent to which our interpretive approach, 
embedded in a single case study, enabled 
us to capture the patterns that would 
have been difficult to discern otherwise. 
Thirdly, we present our results and dis-
cuss both our theoretical contributions 
and the managerial implications. 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
We first review the literature on IT im-
plementation and use and show the extent 
to which additional factors are needed to 
explain ORA use given its interorganiza-
tional nature. Research on ORAs to date 
has mainly focused on perceived out-
comes to explain its use. However, the 
IOS literature also points to the role of 
organizational capabilities as well as that 
of the institutional environment (Robey 
et al., 2008; Kurnia and Johnston, 2000). 
We thus discuss the extent to which these 
two determinants matter in the context of 
IOS use. 
2.1. IT implementation and use 
in organizations
IT implementation in organizations is 
typically a multi-stage process, from initia-
tion of the IT, to its adoption, adaptation, 
acceptance, routinization and infusion 
(Cooper and Zmud, 1990). The first three 
phases are defined at the organizational 
level. In the first phase the organization 
identifies an unmet need or opportunity 
and scans the environment looking for 
possible technologies to meet that need 
(initiation). It then selects a specific IT 
and decides to invest in the resources to 
implement it (adoption). Finally, it installs 
and/or customizes the IT to its needs 
while also modifying organizational pol-
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icies and procedures to accommodate 
the new IT (adaptation). In our case, the 
search for an ORA begins at the initiation 
stage, followed by organizational adop-
tion and/or adaptation of the system to 
organizational needs.
The last three phases represent the be-
haviors of the intended individual users 
of the IT in question within the adopting 
organization. During these phases, users 
commit to using the IT (acceptance), use 
the IT as a normal or routine activity in 
their work (routinization), and/or use IT 
in a comprehensive manner to improve 
organizational effectiveness or to support 
higher-order work (infusion). Although 
initiation, adoption, and/or adaptation are 
prerequisite conditions for the successful 
use of organizational IT such as ORAs, the 
success of the system depends on indi-
vidual users acceptance (or rejection) of 
the IT, and its subsequent routinized and 
infused use. Just because an IT is adopted 
and installed in an organization does not 
mean that it will be accepted and used by 
organizational users. If IT use is voluntary, 
individual users may reject the IT for rea-
sons such as lack of utility or usability. On 
the other hand, if IT use is mandated, us-
ers may use it reluctantly and be unhappy 
with the choice forced on them. Some 
users may even try to delay, obstruct or 
underutilize the new IT (Jasperson et al., 
2005).  In fact, the fail rate of IT imple-
mentation has remained high over the 
last 30 years, at around 70% (Cecez-Kec-
manovic and Kautz, 2014). 
In view of the importance of individu-
al-level IT use for the success of organi-
zational IT, a large body of IT acceptance 
research has examined the factors that 
drive IT use and/or the constraints that 
limit it. Factors include perceived useful-
ness, ease of use, social norms, facilitat-
ing conditions, personal innovativeness, 
self-efficacy, habit and enjoyment (see 
Lee et al. 2003, Legris et al. 2003, and 
Venkatesh et al. 2003 for extensive re-
views). These factors have been distilled 
into many models designed to predict IT 
use, such as the technology acceptance 
model (TAM) (Davis et al. 1989) and 
UTAUT2 (Venkatesh et al. 2012). In gen-
eral, the factors presumed to influence IT 
use can be grouped into three sets: (1) 
individual assessment of IT features such 
as its usefulness and ease of use, (2) in-
dividual user characteristics such as IT 
self-efficacy and intrinsic motivation, and 
(3) characteristics of the immediate task 
environment such as social influence or 
facilitating conditions (Van Offenbeek et 
al. 2013).  
Despite the above body of knowledge, 
the determinants of ORA use remain un-
clear. Although one may expect several 
of the factors described above to be per-
tinent to ORA use, given the unique in-
terorganizational nature of ORAs, several 
additional interorganizational factors may 
also influence ORA acceptance and use 
that have not previously been considered 
in the literature. One of the objectives of 
our paper is to identify such factors. 
2.2. Perceived outcomes as the 
main determinants of ORA use 
ORAs were designed to help buyers 
improve their economic purchasing per-
formance (Jap, 2003; Williams and Do-
bie, 2011). They result in cost reductions 
(Smart and Harrison, 2003; Smeltzer and 
Carr, 2003) and ostensibly enable buyers 
to discover ‘real’ market prices (Grewal 
et al., 2003). ORA use also tends to result 
in more flexible negotiation processes, 
wider sourcing horizons (Daly and Nath, 
2005; Jap, 2002) and reduced administra-
tive and logistics costs (Hur et al., 2007). 
Furthermore, buyers can use ORAs to 
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shake up their suppliers, encouraging 
them to reconsider their cost structures 
and be more competitive (Jap, 2001). 
For suppliers, ORAs may offer a range 
of benefits. The IOS implies a more open 
tender process, and provides potential 
access to new buyers, greater visibility of 
competitor pricing and an overview of 
competing bidders and market activities. 
ORAs constitute an excellent opportunity 
for suppliers to benchmark against their 
rivals, assess their competitiveness and 
obtain an overview of the market in which 
they are active (Daly and Nath, 2005). In 
addition, it gives them an opportunity to 
penetrate new markets since buyers tend 
to include new suppliers with whom they 
have not previously transacted in the 
auctions in order to increase competi-
tion (Emiliani, 2000; Smart and Harisson, 
2003; Smeltzer and Carr, 2002, 2003; Wag-
ner and Schwab, 2004). 
Like any other auction (Bakos,1997; 
McAfee and McMillan,1987), ORAs can 
provide enhanced transparency in busi-
ness relations (Carter et al., 2004; Wagner 
and Schwab, 2004). This results in more 
information being made available to sup-
pliers, and reduces information-asymme-
try for both groups of players (Smeltzer 
and Carr, 2002; Jap, 2002; Emiliani, 2005). 
ORAs can thus bring transparency to the 
negotiation process (Caby-Guillet et al., 
2007) as well as greater price transpar-
ency (Soh and Markus, 2002; Soh et al., 
2006). However, Giampietro and Emil-
iani (2007) suggest that ORA use creates 
one-way transparency since suppliers 
gain little or no insights into the buying 
firms. This may lead suppliers to feel 
that buyers exert their power unfairly, 
consequently damaging collaborative 
relations, which may in turn lead to lost 
opportunities for future joint initiatives, 
or suppliers using retaliatory behavior in 
response to perceived injustices (Emil-
iani and Stec, 2004; 2005; Jap, 2003; Tass-
abehji et al., 2006). 
In addition, more upfront preparation 
of ORAs by buyers compared to other 
sourcing arrangements leads to a signifi-
cant compression of cycle time, which is 
even shorter for repeated auctions (Car-
ter et al., 2004). They also compress sales 
orders and RFQ (request for quotation) 
cycle times, (Smart and Harrison, 2003). 
This reduces transaction costs for both 
buyers and suppliers (Daly and Nath, 
2005). 
Despite the above-mentioned incen-
tives, both buyers and suppliers have ex-
perienced a number of challenges in their 
use of ORAs. Buying firms report varying 
returns on investment (Handfield et al., 
2002) and, in some cases, the price reduc-
tions obtained through ORAs have not 
been large enough to cover the e-auction 
service fees (Hannon, 2003). Indeed, some 
authors have noted that the compressed 
timeframe of open-bid auctions creates a 
stressful context for suppliers. It prevents 
them from carefully considering price 
bids, giving them the feeling that they are 
“out of control” (Jap 2003). Together with 
the higher visibility and salience of com-
petition in ORAs, it may even cause them 
to make concessions – particularly at the 
end of the bidding process – that go fur-
ther than they had in mind at the outset 
(Carter et al., 2004). Moreover, authors 
such as Jap (2003) have suggested that 
ORAs increase suppliers’ distrust of buy-
ing firms, since the open-bid process is 
frequently considered as “exploitative and 
unfair”. Consistent with this conjecture, 
Smeltzer and Carr (2003) note that most 
of their interviewees were concerned 
with the negative impact that ORAs can 
have on buyer–supplier relationships. Jap 
(2003) concludes that the perception of 
opportunism surrounding online reverse 
auctions can seriously harm relationships 
07-37 Boukef.indd   12 12/07/16   17:27
6
Systèmes d'Information et Management, Vol. 21 [2016], Iss. 1, Art. 2
http://aisel.aisnet.org/sim/vol21/iss1/2
UNDERSTANDING ONLINE REVERSE AUCTION DETERMINANTS OF USE: A MULTI-STAKEHOLDER CASE STUDY 
13
between buyers and suppliers, and even 
creates distrust (Charki and Josserand, 
2008). Carter and Kauffman (2007) empir-
ically showed that perceptions of oppor-
tunism decrease relationship trust and 
purchaser commitment, which ultimately 
leads to reduced supplier performance 
in factors other than price (e.g. weak re-
sponse to delivery problems and buyer 
requests, no preferred access in times of 
high demand, slow access to innovations, 
and a lack of quality improvement initia-
tives). 
Carter and his colleagues (2004) added 
that the vast majority of suppliers in their 
study reported adverse effects on their re-
lationship with buyers following the intro-
duction of ORAs. The complaints included 
damage to such practices as collaborative 
problem-solving, development of trust-
ing long-term business relationships and 
joint capability-development. In the same 
vein, Tassabehji et al. (2006) found that 
suppliers may perceive ORA adoption as 
a sign that the buyers fail to take all their 
previous investment, collaborative effort 
and satisfaction provided in the past into 
consideration. For Jap (2003), the suppli-
ers felt that ORA called into question all 
forms of partnership between the two 
parties, to the extent that they complain 
about an absence of fairness. Giampietro 
and Emiliani (2007) advanced a related 
concern regarding ORAs, observing that 
words such as exploitative (Jap, 2001) 
and coertion (Emiliani and Stec, 2005) 
are common across the industry and ac-
ademic literature with regard to how sup-
pliers view ORAs. 
Giving these problems related to ORAs 
use and the extent to which buyers’ op-
portunism can be harmful to buyer-sup-
plier relationships (Charki et al., 2011), 
suppliers are now reluctant to use ORAs. 
Indeed, many suppliers refuse to use 
ORAs unless they are forced to do so by 
buyers (Emiliani and Stec, 2005; Giampi-
etro and Emiliani, 2007). This refusal can 
become systematic and can even call the 
use of ORAs into question, since in some 
cases buyers have been obliged to cancel 
the ORAs because of the lack of suppliers 
willing to take part to the bidding (Boukef 
et al., 2011). 
As our discussion of the prevailing liter-
ature shows, advocates and opponents of 
ORAs have constructed a number of argu-
ments to explain their use. It also shows 
that the existing literature largely focuses 
on the perceived outcomes (enablers and 
barriers) to explain buyers’ and suppli-
ers’ use of ORAs. The IOS literature has 
shown that both organizational capabili-
ties and the interorganizational environ-
ment matter in explaining IOS use (Robey 
et al., 2008; Kurnia and Johnston, 2000). 
However, these two dimensions have not 
been explored in the case of ORAs. In the 
following section, we discuss the extent 
to which organizational capabilities as 
well as context of use matter from a theo-
retical standpoint in the case of IOS use. 
2.3. Going beyond perceived out-
comes as the main determinants 
of ORA use: considering the role 
of organizational capabilities and 
context of use 
2.3.1. Organizational capabilities 
as a determinant of IOS use 
IS researchers have acknowledged orga-
nizational capability as an enabler of IOS 
use. This refers to the set of skills needed 
to use an IT. For instance, in their exten-
sive review of the IOS literature, Robey et 
al. (2008) highlighted the role of organiza-
tional readiness to foster adoption, which 
refers not only to the internal resources of 
the firms studied, but also to those of its 
07-37 Boukef.indd   13 12/07/16   17:27
7
Boukef et al.: Understanding Online Reverse Auction Determinants of Use: A Multi
Published by AIS Electronic Library (AISeL), 2016
SYSTÈMES D’INFORMATION ET MANAGEMENT
14
trading partners. This encompasses top 
management commitment (Iacovou et 
al., 1995; Premkumar et al., 1997; Robey et 
al., 2008), availability of IT infrastructures 
and trading partner experience. In an-
other study, Kurnia and Johnston (2000) 
pointed to different forms of organiza-
tional capabilities that foster adoption, 
including top management commitment, 
clear vision, competitiveness, adequate 
education, communication openness, the 
right selection of performance measures, 
flexibility, and availability of an IT infra-
structure. 
However, in addition to the intrinsic 
importance of organizational capability in 
terms of IOS use, the focus cannot be re-
stricted to the organizational capabilities 
of a specific firm, but also need to include 
those of the trading partners (Rai et al., 
2006; Baraldi et al., 2012). Indeed, pro-
curing the expected benefits depends on 
the trading partners’ willingness to adopt 
the IOS as well as their own capabilities. 
In effect, lack of cooperation between the 
trading partners can compromise suc-
cess (Bala and Venkatesh, 2007). Conse-
quently, exploration of the role of the or-
ganizational capabilities of both the focal 
firm and the trading partner is important 
in the context of ORAs. 
2.3.2. The role of the institutional 
context in explaining IOS use 
In addition to the role of organizational 
capabilities, Robey et al. (2008) highlight 
that of the external environment to ex-
plain IOS use, which includes “competi-
tive pressure, government pressure, busi-
ness partner power and support from the 
initiator” (p.501). More specifically, re-
search on IOS adoption has emphasized 
the extent to which institutional factors 
can promote adoption (Teo et al., 2003; 
Bala and Venkatesh, 2007). For instance, 
Teo et al. (2003) pointed to the extent to 
which the institutional context influences 
IOS adoption. They differentiate between 
mimetic (“the extent of adoption by com-
petitors and perceived success of adop-
tion by competitors”,  p.27), coercive 
(“perceived dominance of supplier adopt-
ers, perceived dominance of customer 
adopters and conformity with parent cor-
poration’s practices”, p.27) and norma-
tive pressures (“the extent of existing IOS 
adoption by an organization’s suppliers 
and customers, and participation in pro-
fessional trade and business bodies that 
promote and disseminate information 
on IOS adoption”,  p.28). They demon-
strate that normative pressures have the 
most significant impact on predicting IOS 
adoption. This can be explained by the 
dominant role played by the government 
and trade associations in encouraging 
adoption. However, as Rodon et al. (2011) 
argue, despite the institutions’ role in fos-
tering IOS use, it is rare that an authority 
promotes its acceptance and use. This 
explains the relative freedom of users re-
garding the adoption or rejection of the 
system. The adoption rate of IOS is very 
slow and may be subject to rejection (Ra-
jaguru and Matanda, 2013).  
While research has acknowledged the 
institutional context in determining IOS 
use, it has not taken into account poten-
tial changes to this context and how these 
may impact on use. The institutional con-
text is subject to variation and IOS use 
itself can lead to an institutional change 
(Reimers et al., 2014). For instance, Ro-
don et al. (2011) demonstrated that IOS 
use generates interventions that can mod-
ify either the users’ institutional context 
or the institutional features of IOS, and 
these interventions can foster IOS assim-
ilation.
Taking such theoretical gaps into con-
sideration, our paper contends that both 
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organizational capabilities and the insti-
tutional context matter in explaining the 
determinants (enablers and/or barriers) 
of ORA use. More particularly, this paper 
explores the extent to which organiza-
tional capabilities can either enhance or 
hinder ORA use. We also investigate the 
role played by the interorganizational 
environment, notably in the light of the 
institutional change that has had a signifi-
cant impact on ORA use. Given the prolif-
eration of opportunism fostered by ORAs, 
the French government voted a law that 
aimed to regulate its use. This legal inter-
vention has undoubtedly had an  impact 
on ORA use. 
METHODOLOGY 
Consistent with the focus of our re-
search, namely to understand the deter-
minants of ORA use through the perspec-
tive of buyers and suppliers, and how a 
change in the institutional context can 
affect it, we conducted a positivist case 
study (Benbasat et al., 1987; Dubé & Paré, 
2003). 
The case study methodology is well 
adapted to our research question since 
IOS is a phenomenon that is hard to sepa-
rate from its environment (Reimers et al., 
2014). Moreover, a case study is a good 
empirical research method for investigat-
ing complex phenomena since it gives us 
a holistic understanding of real-life events 
(Yin, 2013) and expounds relationships 
involving multiple causal chains (Petti-
grew, 1992). While case study research is 
mainly used for exploration and hypothe-
sis generation, it can also be used to pro-
vide explanations (Benbasat et al., 1987). 
Case studies are indeed particularly suit-
able for how and why questions. Positivist 
case studies are used when “a priori fixed 
relationships” exist (Dubé and Paré, 2003, 
p.604). In our case, our literature review 
showed that ORA use can not only be 
explained by its perceived outcomes but 
also indicated that organizational capabili-
ties as well as institutional context matter. 
Our qualitative approach aims to improve 
our understanding of these determinants 
of use given the specific context of use in 
question. Indeed qualitative data is par-
ticularly rich and provide “thick descrip-
tions” (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p.10) 
for a specific phenomenon embedded in 
a context. 
3.1. The case study context
Single case studies are well accepted in 
the IS literature (Dubé and Paré, 2003) 
and have often been used for their capac-
ity to provide in-depth understanding of 
information systems as embedded in their 
social context (Orlikowski and Iacono, 
2001). We opted for a case of an under-in-
vestigated IOS in the IS field, namely, 
online reverse auctions. We undertook 
an in-depth case study in the context of 
a leading French retail2 organization. The 
retail industry provides an interesting 
context as it has a long history of IOS use. 
Our retailer was looking to understand its 
buyers’ and suppliers’ interpretations and 
meanings related to their experiences as-
sociated with ORA use. The retailer had a 
challenging position in the French retail 
industry and wanted to exploit the IOS in 
order to gain a stronger competitive edge. 
ORA use enables the retailer to reduce 
the cost associated to the buying process 
and thus to improve its margins. ORAs are 
used to buy store brand products such as 
toys, textile, do-it-yourself goods, outdoor 
and garden-related goods. These prod-
2 For reasons of confidentiality and simplification, we will use the term ‘retailer’ to refer to the French retailer 
that was the subject of our investigation
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ucts entail different degrees of innova-
tion, however price is the main selection 
criterion. The supplier who offers the best 
price (i.e. the lowest price) at the end of 
the auction wins the bid. Thus, the sup-
plier selection is transparent and based 
on price. This contrasts with other forms 
of auction which are “buyer determined” 
since the buyer has the right to select the 
winner. This means that criteria other than 
price can be taken into account (Jap and 
Haruvy, 2008). Caby-Guillet et al. (2007) 
mentioned some of the different types of 
criteria that can influence the outcome of 
the bidding event such as quality, quantity 
and shipping conditions. 
ORAs are hosted in the B2B market-
place which is a consortium. During data 
collection, the name of the platform was 
Agentrics. It has changed since then to 
become Neogrid.3 The B2B marketplace 
offers numerous supply chain services 
such as integration and planning and re-
plenishment. 
Our key informant, the B2B projects 
manager, played a major role in the study 
since she was responsible for a relatively 
new department whose mission was to 
source new technologies that could sup-
port all the B2B processes linking the 
retailer with its suppliers. In this case, 
the B2B department had the mandate to 
convince buyers, and thus suppliers, to 
use the online reverse auction technology 
that had reached the level of general de-
ployment (Fichman and Kemerer (1997). 
This corresponds to a state where a new 
IS is used substantially. Indeed, ORAs sup-
port the entire suppliers’ selection pro-
cess, and most buyers and suppliers use 
them. 
Our key interlocutor helped us to iden-
tify appropriate interviewees who could 
inform our research question. We con-
ducted interviews with three groups of 
informants: IT initiators (actors who took 
part in the sourcing, initiation and in-
fluencing the sense-making of the IOS), 
buyers (actors involved in the IOS use) 
and suppliers (actors involved in the IOS 
use).  
Our approach was also influenced by 
Lamb and Kling’s (2003) work, which indi-
cates the need to develop a new vision of 
the user as an active social actor who ne-
gotiates the technology’s use and, at the 
same time, is shaped by complex changes 
in the environmental settings and orga-
nizational structures. Consequently, we 
took into consideration a significant in-
stitutional change that occurred though 
the enactment of a new law designed to 
influence the use of ORAs. The new leg-
islation sought to regulate business rela-
tionships between suppliers and retailers 
taking part in ORAs, mainly because of the 
several reported instances of unethical 
use. In effect, despite the initial promises, 
the literature is full of examples of un-
ethical ORA use. These include allowing 
unqualified suppliers to use the system or 
running falsified auctions where buyers 
or market-makers pretend to be suppli-
ers in order to drive down the prices of 
genuine, reliable suppliers (see notably 
the work of Emiliani (2005) and Charki 
et al. (2011) for a complete review of the 
main ethical irregularities associated with 
ORA use). Thus, the French government 
voted the first legal intervention in June 
2005, known as the Dutreil law (Offi-
cial Journal of the Republic of France n° 
179, 3rd August, 2005 page 12639, NOR: 
PMEX0500079L).  
In view of this major change and the role 
that the institutional perspective can play 
3 https://www.neogrid.com/uk
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in the use of a technology (Swanson and 
Ramiller, 1997), we decided to conduct a 
complementary study in order to discern 
the extent to which such institutional 
changes may influence buyers’ and suppli-
ers’ interpretations of their use of an IOS. 
The following section describes our data 
collection method and its rationale. 
3.2. Data collection & analysis
We used the interview guide approach 
(Patton, 2002) to conduct our interviews 
with all of our informants during the two 
phases of the study. The first phase lasted 
14 months (from April 2005 to June 2006), 
while the second phase lasted 8 months 
(from April to December 2008). The in-
terview guide was tailored to match the 
profiles of the different stakeholders. Our 
focus throughout the interviews was to 
understand the enablers and barriers to 
ORA use.4
Most of the interviews were conducted 
in French. Three interviews in the first 
phase and one interview in the second 
phase were conducted in English. All of 
the interviews lasted between 30 minutes 
and 2 hours and 15 minutes. In total, we 
conducted 122 semi-structured inter-
views, sixty-seven interviews during the 
first phase and fifty-five during the second 
data collection phase.5 Our focus was on 
buyer and supplier enablers and barriers 
to use (e.g. why they use ORAs, what are 
their main motivations for using ORAs, 
what stops them from using ORAs, etc.). 
Interviews with the IT initiators gave us 
further insights into the context of use as 
well as the determinants of use for both 
buyers and suppliers. 
Data analyses proceeded in several 
stages. First, and in line with the recom-
mendations by Eisenhardt and Bourgeois 
(1988), we transcribed each interview 
as verbatim to increase the reliability of 
our data. This amounted to 750 pages of 
script from the first data collection stage 
and 689 pages from the second stage, en-
abling us to perform a meticulous analy-
sis of the use of ORAs by different stake-
holders, paying particular attention to the 
context of use and the extent to which 
the latter may influence use. We then con-
ducted a qualitative and thematic analysis 
of the interview data with the help of the 
N-vivo statistical software program (Rich-
ards 1999). 
Data iterations enabled us to generate 
original findings. In line with recommen-
dations by Miles and Huberman (1994), we 
examined each text comprehensively, line 
by line, in order to become familiar with 
the different ways in which informants 
interpreted ORAs and the factors that in-
fluenced ORA use. We grouped our codes 
into three themes (perceived outcomes, 
capabilities and new enablers, and barriers 
to ORA use resulting from the new law). 
Our codes were derived either from the 
existing IS literature or were emergent 
from our data. Since we used semi-struc-
tured interviews, the interviewees were 
able to express themselves freely, pro-
viding us with unexpected findings. Our 
coding6 relied on an extensive additional 
literature review regarding IOS use and 
ORA use in particular (e.g., see Carter et 
al. 2004; Jap 2002, 2003, 2007; Tassabehji et 
al. 2006), and also gave rise to some unex-
pected findings and nuances related to the 
enablers and barriers to ORA use, which 
in turn improved our understanding. For 
4 See appendix A for the interview guides. 
5 See appendix B for detailed information on our sampling logic 
6 See appendix C for further details in our coding.
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instance, we had not considered the role 
of the law in dissuading buyers from using 
ORAs. Consequently, our results emerged 
from successive iterations between the 
data and existing IOS literature.
We also used matrix displays to high-
light differences between buyer and sup-
plier enablers and barriers to use (Miles 
and Huberman, 1994). These matrixes 
were particularly useful in improving our 
understanding of the differences and sim-
ilarities that characterize buyer and sup-
plier enablers and barriers. 
We were not only interested in the 
presence or absence of coding catego-
ries, but also in the relationships between 
these categories and the extent to which 
a change in the institutional context can 
impact on use.
4. RESULTS 
We first showed the extent to which 
perceived outcomes that explain ORA 
use differ between buyers and suppliers. 
We then highlighted the role of capabil-
ities as a determinant of ORA use. More 
particularly, we identified a dichotomy in 
terms of the implications of capabilities 
between buyers and suppliers. We found 
that while buyers use ORAs in order to 
leverage their capabilities, suppliers are 
obliged to renounce some of their com-
petitive capabilities, which constitutes a 
barrier to ORA use. Finally, we highlighted 
the extent to which a change in the insti-
tutional context can negatively influence 
ORA use. At the same time as it failed to 
overcome the barrier created by buyers’ 
opportunism, the main factor behind the 
climate of distrust, it created a new barrier 
to ORA use for buyers due to the controls 
and sanctions imposed.
4.1. Different perceived out-
comes between buyers and sup-
pliers 
While transparency is a determinant for 
both buyers and suppliers in ORA use, 
our results illustrate different perceived 
outcomes between the two partners that 
can either motivate or deter them from 
opting to use ORAs. 
4.1.1. Transparency perceived by 
both buyers and suppliers
Both the buyers and the suppliers we 
interviewed considered that ORAs can 
help to enhance transparency. Indeed, 
the visibility of all the bids by suppliers 
provides better transparency in the ne-
gotiation process, promoting the percep-
tion of fairness, as indicated by one IT 
initiator: “the main consequence of ORA 
use is better transparency and improved 
equity.” Buyers argued that transparency 
has the advantage of erasing any suspicion 
of favoritism from the relationship: “ORAs 
have the advantage of showing suppliers 
that we’re not favoring one supplier at 
the expense of another… everyone can 
see the extent to which the others are 
able to make a proposal.” This view was 
confirmed by suppliers, since ORA use 
gives them all the same opportunity to 
win the bid without any consideration for 
existing buyer-supplier relationships, as 
the following supplier pointed out: “one 
of the advantages of ORAs is that we are 
all equal, we all have our chance to win 
the bid.” Following the same reasoning, 
another supplier added: “Our policy is 
to take part in ORAs since they are very 
effective for suppliers in terms of discov-
ering the winning bid and so making 
negotiations more transparent.” Thus, 
transparency was at times interpreted as 
synonymous with enhanced equity in the 
interorganizational relationships: “Equity 
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and neutrality are two of the main mo-
tivations behind engaging in electronic 
marketplaces” one electronic market-
place informant acknowledged.
This transparency enables both buyers 
and suppliers to concentrate on objec-
tive criteria in the negotiation process, 
as highlighted by the following buying 
manager: “the main point of using ORAs 
is the transparency of the negotiation by 
eliminating all subjective criteria and 
concentrating only on objective ones.” 
However, some suppliers were suspicious 
of the claimed advantage of transparency 
because of the risk of inappropriate use 
when unreliable suppliers were invited, 
as suggested by the following supplier: 
“if you get suppliers to take part only to 
reduce prices, I wouldn’t call that better 
transparency” (Supplier).
4.1.2. Buyers discover real prices 
and enlarge their sourcing hori-
zons, but also come up against un-
expected barriers 
Our data shows that ORAs supposedly 
enable buyers to discover suppliers’ ‘real’ 
prices, in other words, the real optimal 
price that the supplier can accept, while 
achieving an optimal return. As one buyer 
stated: “the auction lets us see how far 
a supplier is able to reduce his price.” 
Another buyer added: “it’s always inter-
esting to see how much a supplier can 
lower bids during the bidding event.” 
Still, the same transparency can also lead 
to resentment if buyers discover that sup-
pliers have not been offering their best 
prices in the past: “We’ve been working 
with the same manufacturer for 15 years 
and we thought we were buying at com-
petitive prices.” 
At the same time, as the following inter-
viewee notes, ORAs allow buyers to en-
large their sourcing horizons: “ORAs help 
us to widen our sourcing horizons. They 
offer us more flexibility in terms of choice 
of suppliers” (Buyer). Moreover, they 
enable buyers to streamline their buy-
ing process by avoiding multiple rounds 
of traditional face-to-face negotiations: 
“ORAs are a tool that allows buyers to 
free up time from the mechanical aspect 
of negotiations so they can focus more 
on added-value activities.” Some buyers 
told us that ORAs are used to ensure that 
their suppliers continue to work on their 
competitiveness by making them aware 
of their competitors’ capacity to reduce 
prices: “Setting up ORAs means we can 
give some suppliers wake-up calls and 
see the extent to which they are really 
willing to continue working with us… 
It makes suppliers aware of the industry 
realities and helps them to judge whether 
they are still competitive.” 
However, alongside these incentives 
and benefits, our data analysis unexpect-
edly revealed some barriers that stopped 
buyers from engaging in and contributing 
to ORAs. As the ORA system determines 
the winning suppliers, some buyers 
feared losing control over the purchas-
ing process: “Some buyers refuse to use 
ORAs because they don’t like the idea of 
losing control over deal allocation de-
cisions. In fact, with ORAs it’s no longer 
the buyer who decides, but the market.” 
Another interviewee said that despite the 
improved performance that ORAs can of-
fer buyers, the latter might not want to 
use the system as it could be perceived 
as a competitor calling into question 
the buyer’s previous negotiation perfor-
mance: “Generally, buyers don’t like to 
be in competition with another system 
that generates better results, even if it’s 
a machine.” Some of the suppliers attrib-
uted the lack of motivation to the buyers’ 
wish to control the negotiation process by 
deciding on the supplier(s) they prefer to 
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work with: “Buyers know that they may 
have to deal with suppliers they don’t 
like. ORAs take away their ability to de-
cide.” Paradoxically, buyers may also fear 
a deterioration in their purchasing perfor-
mance: “Surprisingly, some buyers call 
their suppliers during the bidding and 
try to make them bid around the same 
amount they quoted in the past in tradi-
tional negotiations… They’re afraid that 
their managers will think that they failed 
to achieve the same performance in the 
past…” (Supplier). 
4.1.3. Opportunities to penetrate 
new markets and suppliers’ con-
cerns about buyers’ opportunism
From the suppliers’ perspective, we 
found that those who come in as chal-
lengers are particularly keen to use ORAs 
since they view the IOS as an opportunity 
to penetrate new markets and bench-
mark themselves with incumbents. As 
one buyer representative argued: “I think 
that the greatest advantage of ORAs for 
suppliers is the ability to penetrate new 
markets, especially as the traditional 
way is generally long for challengers.” 
Suppliers confirmed this: “Initially, ORAs 
[…] enabled us to penetrate the retailer’s 
market.” Moreover, other supplier repre-
sentatives pointed to the benefits associ-
ated with benchmarking: “ORAs can help 
us to benchmark with competitors… If 
our bid is too far from the winning bid, 
we review our processes and practices.” 
However, suppliers may also hesitate to 
use ORAs, among other things because 
of the proliferation of opportunism as-
sociated with ORA use by certain buyers. 
In this regard, a buyer representative ad-
vanced: “Some of my suppliers told me 
that they wouldn’t take part in future 
ORAs… Unethical behavior by others has 
made them suspicious of this technol-
ogy.” These unethical practices include 
phantom or shill bidding, for example, 
as illustrated by the following supplier’s 
comment: “some suppliers took part in 
the bidding event just to force other sup-
pliers to reduce their bids… This can 
lead to distrust, especially if it’s used sys-
tematically.” Other opportunistic buyer 
activities involve bluff during the ORAs by 
inviting unreliable suppliers: “The buyer 
can bluff in a classic negotiation and he 
can totally bluff in ORAs… usually the 
other buyers invite all potential suppli-
ers but the thing is that they don’t play in 
the same category as me. I’ve used ORAs 
where some suppliers should never have 
been there” (Supplier). We also found ev-
idence that some buyers can use ORAs 
just to compare the prices of suppliers 
with no intention of awarding them any 
business, as suggested by the following 
remark from a supplier representative: 
“Some ORAs were cancelled for reasons 
we never discovered…the buyer just 
wanted to find out about market trends.”
Other suppliers revealed further forms 
of unethical behavior, such as when buy-
ers disturb the online bidding event if the 
outcome is not going in their favor. This 
is illustrated by the following quote from 
one supplier’s account manager: “Often 
the buyer calls during the bidding event 
to put undue pressure on the suppliers... 
He/she calls saying: “I don’t understand, 
you didn’t bid and you risk losing the 
deal...” This can destabilize the suppliers. 
We mustn’t forget though that it’s not a 
casino game and behind it there are fac-
tories with jobs, so we can’t bid just any-
thing to win. Lots of buyers do this and 
it puts pressure on suppliers during the 
auction.”
The extent of such opportunism has 
strengthened suppliers’ belief that ORAs 
are uniquely in the economic interest of 
buyers, destroying producers’ margins 
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and even putting their survival at risk, 
as suggested by the following supplier: 
“ORAs kill companies; we can’t build a 
firm’s strategy with ORAs. There’s no trust. 
Cost is the only driver. We’re really afraid 
that ORAs will destabilize the market.” 
This has led to suspicion and distrust, se-
riously weakening a keystone of business 
relationships, as suggested by this sup-
plier representative: “I think that ORAs 
interfere with communication. They 
destroy confidence, and create mistrust 
and suspicion.” Buyers acknowledged 
the legitimacy of suppliers’ concerns fol-
lowing abuses that sometimes had a dra-
matic economic impact on businesses. “I 
mainly work with small and medium in-
ternational companies; they’re very wor-
ried whenever we mention ORAs…I can 
understand why they’re afraid…”  
Given the extent of this opportunism 
and its dramatic impact on their margins, 
suppliers became reluctant to take part in 
ORAs, as one supplier indicated: “I don’t 
like ORAs, we don’t want to take part 
anymore because of all the abuses we’ve 
spoken about…” This refusal affected all 
retailers, whether they used ORAs oppor-
tunistically or not: “I won’t take part in 
ORAs again whoever the host retailer is.” 
Some buyers confirmed this refusal by 
suppliers to use ORAs, as in the following 
quote: “we sometimes have suppliers re-
fusing to take part in ORAs for economic 
or ethical reasons.” 
4.2. Capabilities are determinant 
of ORA use for both buyers and 
suppliers 
Our analysis shows that buyers and sup-
pliers who previously met for face-to-face 
negotiations had to develop new skills in 
order to use ORAs efficiently. In fact, this 
was one of the ORA coordinator’s main re-
sponsibilities: “I’m responsible for training 
and assistance, and I have to help buyers 
to use ORAs in a way that matches their 
procurement needs.” This corresponded 
to the opinion of a manager from the IT 
department who acknowledged that: “us-
ing ORAs requires a new relationship 
management methodology.”
Our analysis thus indicates that ORA use 
requires specific capabilities for buyers, 
while suppliers have to renounce some of 
their capabilities, constituting a barrier to 
ORA use. 
4.2.1. Buyers need to develop their 
ORA capabilities  
Buyer representatives, for example, had 
to develop the capacity to select a larger 
number of reliable suppliers that were able 
to honor their bids ex-post, rather than 
narrowing down the number of suppliers 
after organizing ‘beauty-contests’ and en-
gaging in intensive partner selection pro-
cesses. When buyers do not develop such 
skills, suppliers are less inclined to sub-
mit a bid: “If the buyer invites suppliers 
without being selective, that bothers me.” 
Another supplier confirmed this: “If I can 
trust the selection process, I won’t have 
any problem negotiating with buyers 
in ORAs, but the problem is that buyers 
don’t go through this process adequately 
each time.” Buyers themselves also rec-
ognized the need to select suppliers care-
fully prior to the bidding stage. Some of 
them, however, admitted that they did 
not have the resources to systematically 
audit suppliers before bidding: “I don’t 
have time to visit all my suppliers and 
audit their capabilities… It takes a lot of 
time and money.”
In addition, engaging in ORAs means 
buyers need to improve their ability to 
write and develop precise and meticulous 
Requests for Quotations (RFQs) to ensure 
that their interpretations concerning the 
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goods to be purchased are aligned with 
those of the prospective suppliers. As one 
supplier said: “The ORA process must be 
fully grasped […], notably through the de-
velopment of meticulous RFQs.” Similarly, 
the ORA coordinator noted the impor-
tance of beefing-up buyers’ capabilities in 
this domain, a crucial skill for the system to 
be used appropriately: “If the buyer can’t 
develop a professional RFQ, then products 
can’t be compared and consequently we 
can’t initiate ORAs… Buyers must become 
a lot more professional… In effect, if they 
can’t write meticulous RFQs, suppliers 
won’t be able to take part in ORAs, since 
the products will be incomparable.”
Moreover, the buying firm and the mar-
ket-maker (electronic marketplace (EMP)) 
in this study had to develop several other 
resources, such as e-sourcing technolo-
gies and supplier databases that could be 
shared among their subsidiaries and cli-
ent organizations respectively. The latter 
allowed them to unleash the potential of 
new and competitive suppliers. One buyer 
representative remarked on this aspect: 
“With ORAs and sourcing technologies, we 
can consider more and more suppliers 
so as to anticipate markets and trends.” 
In the same line of reasoning, the person 
responsible for B2B from the IT initiator 
group spoke of the importance of improv-
ing buyers’ sourcing capabilities: “Some 
buyers have told me they can’t use ORAs 
because they only have two suppliers... 
Then I explain that we have resources 
such as databases and e-sourcing that 
can help them to select new suppliers… 
Buyers can also call our offices in Asia.”
4.2.2. Suppliers have to renounce to 
some of their capabilities 
On the supplier side, our data analysis 
revealed that they were unhappy with the 
way that the use of the ORA system af-
fected and even called into question their 
key capabilities. Various capability-related 
issues emerged with respect to the group 
of suppliers. First, they consider that ORAs 
prevent them from leveraging their ability 
to negotiate win-win deals or to innovate 
or respond quickly to buyers’ requests: 
“compared to foreign suppliers – the 
Chinese for instance – I can react more 
quickly… The boat needs six weeks from 
China, while I can react within 24 hours 
or one week. How do you assess my flex-
ibility in ORAs? How do you evaluate all 
the effort, services and investment that 
I’ve made over the last couple of years? 
How do you assess all the time that we’ve 
spent working on the packaging and re-
solving problems in order to satisfy our 
buyers? At the end of the day, ORAs pe-
nalize us...” In similar vein, suppliers feel 
that the use of ORAs reduces their ability 
to add value since they destroy all value 
drivers and limit their scope for negotia-
tion with buyers to the sole criterion of 
price. This is illustrated by the following 
quote: “I try to help the buyer save money 
through product improvements, better 
category management, merchandising, 
market analysis, promotion and con-
sulting, not just by reducing my prices.”
Suppliers also felt that other capabilities 
and resources, such as R&D, product and 
process development, innovation, and ad-
vice and services, had become less impor-
tant or even redundant. They sometimes 
felt as if the use of ORAs limited their role 
to simply clicking the mouse. One sup-
plier summed it up as follows: “There’s no 
advantage in ORA use … I don’t see any 
advantage in destroying jobs and eco-
nomic opportunities… With the leap in 
raw material prices, please tell me how 
we can manage this situation with re-
duced margins… One solution might be 
to make us downsize, stop R&D activities, 
or even send jobs overseas to cut payroll 
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costs.” Existing suppliers also felt that they 
had to compete against newcomers with 
less expertise, notably in terms of quality 
standards: “They can include us in the 
same ORA as other, small foreign suppli-
ers… However, as a multinational com-
pany, we respect stringent quality stan-
dards, certifications and controls.” 
Suppliers further consider the use of 
ORAs as harmful since they reduce per-
sonal contact with buyer representatives. 
This de-socialization prevents suppli-
ers from practicing their advisory role 
and makes them feel that their capabili-
ties have become useless. The following 
quote from a supplier explains how sup-
pliers typically feel about their capabili-
ties: “There’s no relationship anymore, 
it’s completely impersonal… You’re in 
front of your screen watching the price 
drop… The business relationship is re-
duced to its simplest expression.” Another 
supplier regretted the extent to which the 
use of ORAs has destroyed suppliers’ abil-
ity to mobilize their capabilities to create 
added value for the buyer: “ORAs elimi-
nate all discussion with buyers. We no 
longer speak about products, only about 
the minimal specifications written in the 
RFQ that we have to stick to… It’s like 
when we sell a car: the buyer says that 
he/she only needs a car, an engine and 
four wheels. That’s all. ORAs kill suppli-
ers’ creativity and suggestions, although 
I think that it’s the main part of my job 
as a supplier… In fact, I can suggest in-
novations to buyers thanks to my exper-
tise. The problem is that the door is now 
closed to all suggestions.”
In addition to the differences in terms 
of capabilities between buyers and sup-
pliers, the change in the institutional con-
text played a significant role in shaping 
determinants of use. 
4.3. New institutional context 
with different impact on buyer 
and supplier determinants of use
Many buyer and supplier representa-
tives in our study initially had significant 
doubts about ORAs, stemming from differ-
ent objectives, ambiguity and uncertainty 
surrounding the system. In response 
to these concerns and the discovery of 
fraudulent behavior, the French legislator 
enacted the first law in the world to gov-
ern the use of ORA technology. This law 
and the institutions designated to enforce 
it influenced the stakeholders’ incentive 
to use ORAs, as the two factors led to a re-
duction in abusive behaviors. Application 
of the law is undertaken by public agen-
cies that have the power to monitor prac-
tices, either systematically or at the spe-
cific request of suppliers. Moreover, to fa-
cilitate controls, the law obliges buyers to 
record all bidding processes for one year: 
“The buyer or the person organizing the 
auction registers the auction process and 
stores the data for a period of one year. 
This must be presented in the event of an 
investigation conducted under the con-
ditions set out in section 5 of the commer-
cial code” (article L.442.10.2). 
Consequently, any party found guilty of 
making false claims, introducing phantom 
suppliers, or using unauthorized means 
to disrupt the transparency of ORAs now 
risks paying a high price.7 The existence 
of such sanctions has forced users to be 
more careful when it comes to ORAs, as 
one supplier told us: “There’s a high risk 
of controls and the penalties are consid-
erable, which makes users very wary of 
this law.” This was confirmed by the fol-
lowing buyer: “Controls are now written 
into the law and they are extremely con-
straining for buyers. We’re really con-
7 Up to two years in prison and fines of up to €30,000 ($44,124).
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cerned about them. If we have problems 
with suppliers, they can ask for an inves-
tigation to be carried out…” (Buyer). An-
other interviewee commented: “The in-
troduction of the new law also increased 
stakeholders’ ability to use ORAs, since it 
rendered the nature of the game and its 
rules much clearer.” In essence, the law 
increased buyers and suppliers’ mutual 
awareness and understanding of what is 
and is not allowed when using ORAs. 
Still, the new law has different implica-
tions for buyers and suppliers, and this 
influences their use of ORAs differently. 
Indeed, while, the law did not do enough 
to remove the barriers of opportunism for 
suppliers and thus failed to deal with their 
reluctance to use ORAs, it created new bar-
riers for buyers through the tough controls 
and sanctions that dissuaded them from 
using ORAs, despite the economic gains 
they could expect from its use. 
4.3.1. Failure to address distrust
The legal system was slow to react when 
buyers’ opportunistic use of ORAs was first 
detected. Instead, intervention occurred 
once the opportunism had already be-
come relatively widespread and had led 
to general distrust and suspicion. By this 
time, it was hard to eradicate the nega-
tive outcomes of ORA use, as this buyer 
suggested: “I’m sorry that the law was 
passed so long after the start of ORA use. 
They caused a lot of damage and suppli-
ers have such a negative image of the tool 
that it’s hard now to undo the harm.” This 
is particularly true as suppliers lack con-
fidence in the law’s ability to prevent op-
portunism related to ORA use despite the 
tough controls and penalties imposed on 
buyers. Suppliers argue that because of the 
asymmetry of power with buyers, it is very 
hard to apply the law. They are reluctant 
to take buyers to court in the case of sus-
pected opportunism, as they are worried 
about its impact on their business. The 
following supplier explained his unwilling-
ness to confront buyers: “no one will take 
retailers to court; we can’t do it because 
of the imbalance of power between buyers 
and suppliers, they’re too powerful…” An-
other supplier added: “…it’s too risky for 
us to (take buyers to court), no one would 
want to work with us anymore…” 
This distrust of the law is intensified by 
the suppliers’ conviction that buyers can 
get round the legal hurdles. The follow-
ing supplier pointed out: “the results from 
ORAs were globally negative…the big re-
tailers’ legal departments know the law 
very well and the extent to which they 
can get away with it…I don’t want to use 
ORAs and have a bad experience any-
more…” This resentment is confirmed by 
buyers. As one buyer put it: “we can eas-
ily get round the law. However, we need 
to be very cautious.” 
4.3.2. Risk of controls and sanc-
tions: new barriers to buyers’ use 
of ORAs 
Unexpectedly, the introduction of the 
new law led to a reduction in ORA use. By 
introducing tougher controls and severe 
penalties (fines and imprisonment), the 
law made ORA use more complex, conse-
quently reducing take-up of the technol-
ogy since buyers were increasingly reluc-
tant to use the tool, as the following inter-
viewee indicated: “all these regulations 
increase the risk. We do all we can to 
avoid it, since using ORAs increases the 
chances of being controlled. So we use 
fewer ORAs to avoid the risk…ORAs are 
now highly controlled with a real risk of 
penalties that people try to get round…” 
(Buyer).
Thus, while ORA use can help buyers 
to make large savings, the risks related to 
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controls and penalties outweigh the ex-
pected economic gains. Buyers thus pre-
fer not to use ORAs so as to avoid the re-
lated risk, as highlighted by the following 
IT initiator: “The introduction of the law 
was a serious slap in the face and gave 
us a lot more worries…in other words, 
using IT in this case meant greater risk 
of being investigated…so the less you use 
ORAs, the less risk there is of controls” (IT 
initiator). Thus, buyers renounced poten-
tial gains as they preferred to avoid the 
risk of being controlled. 
Despite the perceived gains emanating 
from ORAs, the increased complexity in-
troduced by the law curbed buyers’ en-
thusiasm due to the risk of controls and 
penalties, dissuading them from using the 
IT: “the law has increased the inhibitors 
of ORA use…” (Buyer). This led to a drop 
in ORA use, as confirmed by the suppli-
ers: “we are certainly invited to fewer 
auctions compared to previous years.” 
Our results are summarized in Table 1. 
DISCUSSION 
Given our research question: “What are 
the determinants of ORA use in terms of 
enablers and barriers from the vantage 
point of buyers and suppliers, and how 
can a change in the institutional context 








Extended sourcing horizons 





Fear of losing control over 
the purchasing process




Buyers need to develop new 
capabilities in order to use 
ORAs. This includes sup-
plier selection and writing 
RFQs as well as e-sourcing 
technologies and supplier 
databases. 
Unlike buyers, suppliers 
cannot use some of their 
competitive capabilities 
such as innovation, R&D, 
or reactivity to the buyers’ 
needs. 
Impact of the law  
on use
The law is at the origin of 
new barriers that dissuade 
buyers from using ORAs. 
The risk of controls and pen-
alties imposed by the law 
outweighs perceived advan-
tages, resulting in a reduc-
tion in ORA use.  
The law failed to remove ex-
isting barriers to use related 
to opportunistic behaviors 
that were at the origin of the 
climate of distrust. 
Table 1: Summary of the results: determinants of ORA use
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support the literature on the main deter-
minants of ORAs. In effect, we found that 
better economic performance (Williams 
and Dobie, 2011) and wider sourcing 
horizons (Daly and Nath, 2005) were the 
main drivers for buyers, while new mar-
ket penetration (Smeltzer and Carr, 2003) 
was the most important enabler for sup-
pliers. In the same vein, our results sup-
port initial findings in the literature about 
the degree to which opportunistic behav-
ior, committed mainly on the buying side, 
influenced suppliers’ motivation to stop 
using the system (Tassabehji et al., 2006). 
In effect, abusive use of ORAs called into 
question the expected advantages prom-
ised to suppliers, such as transparency 
and access to industrial benchmarks. We 
contribute to the IS literature by illustrat-
ing the crucial role of organizational capa-
bilities in determining ORA use. We also 
highlight the extent to which a change in 
the institutional context can impact on 
use by unexpectedly creating new barri-
ers. Finally, we point to the role of per-
ceived risk emanating from the law that 
triggered discontinuance of ORA use by 
buyers. 
The IOS literature indicates the degree 
to which the organizational readiness of 
the focal firm (buyer) should evolve to 
meet the new capabilities needed in terms 
of IT sophistication (Chwelos et al., 2001). 
Thus, new capabilities for wider sourcing 
of suppliers and greater ability to develop 
meticulous Requests for Quotation were 
considered important in enhancing orga-
nizational capabilities in the buyers’ use of 
ORAs. However, while the IOS literature 
finds that the organizational readiness of 
the trading partner (suppliers in our con-
text) also needs to be improved to meet 
new IOS expectations (see the compre-
hensive literature review by Robey, Im 
and Wareham (2008)), we found that sup-
pliers considered that ORA use had neg-
ative implications on their capabilities. 
Thus, the adoption of an IOS that rever-
berates negatively on suppliers’ economic 
performance is perceived by the latter as 
a hindrance to their innovative skills, and 
R&D and customer satisfaction become 
redundant since their buyers fail to take 
their capabilities into consideration, view-
ing price as the sole selection criterion. 
We contribute to the IOS literature by 
identifying the extent to which partners 
may have different needs in terms of ca-
pabilities. More particularly, we show that 
IOS use does not necessarily imply an or-
ganizational improvement, but may also 
be associated with the renouncement of 
some strategic capabilities, constituting a 
barrier to ORA use. 
Research on IOS adoption has empha-
sized the extent to which institutional 
factors can promote adoption (Teo et al., 
2003; Bala and Venkatesh, 2007). How-
ever, little is known about the extent to 
which a change in the institutional con-
text may impact on use. Indeed, IOS are 
institutional context change enablers (Re-
imers et al., 2014). More particularly, IOS 
can be at the origin of interventions that 
transform the institutional context (Rodon 
et al., 2011). Rodon et al. (2011) demon-
strated that by changing the institutional 
context, an intervention can foster IOS 
use, thereby achieving its initial aim. Un-
like Rodon et al. (2011) who examine the 
case of an intervention adopted to pro-
mote IOS routinization, our study exam-
ines an intervention designed to regulate 
use by preventing opportunism through 
controls and sanctions. Our findings show 
that in this specific case, the law failed to 
remove the barriers that constrained sup-
pliers’ use of ORAs, and unexpectedly cre-
ated new barriers that limited buyers’ use 
of the technology.  We thus contribute to 
the IS literature by showing the extent to 
which a change in the institutional con-
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text can impact on determinants of use 
by creating new barriers. This confirms 
the crucial role played by the institutional 
context in fostering IOS adoption (Teo et 
al., 2003; Bala and Venkatesh, 2007), not 
only at the outset, but also in later stages 
since it can affect the determinants of use. 
However, we may question the relevance 
of institutional intervention in regulating 
IT use and the extent to which controls 
and sanctions can be dissuasive when it 
comes to dealing with opportunism. In-
deed, the controls and sanctions intro-
duced by the law unexpectedly triggered 
IT discontinuance. Thus, since the gov-
ernment is facing increasing challenges 
with regard to widespread digitalization, 
the question of the effectiveness of its in-
tervention is highly relevant, as is the effi-
cacy of its related mechanisms. 
To date, IS research has tended to focus 
on expected IT performance or perceived 
benefits to explain the use of IOS (Ven-
katesh et al., 2012). Such use can evolve 
over time however (Jasperson et al., 
2005). Users continually revise their initial 
expectations as they gain experience with 
an IT, which they then confirm or discard. 
Intention to continue using an IT is thus 
based on continual comparison between 
IT usage and expected outcomes, which 
leads to either disconfirmation or satis-
faction (Bhattacherjee and Premkumar, 
2004). Our findings indicate that both 
buyers and suppliers showed reluctance 
to continue using the technology, leading 
to some degree of ORA discontinuance. 
With the two exceptions of Bhattacher-
jee (2001), who investigated discontin-
uance at individual level, and Furneaux 
and Wade (2011), who examined it at or-
ganizational level, IT discontinuance has 
largely been overlooked in the IS litera-
ture. For Furneaux and Wade (2011), the 
decision to discontinue at organizational 
level is made rationally, based on the dis-
crepancy between expectations regarding 
the IT in use and its capabilities. Little is 
known about the factors that explain the 
discontinuance of interorganizational sys-
tems (IOS) since most of the related re-
search has focused on adoption (Teo et 
al., 2003; Hart and Saunders, 1997) and 
its subsequent outcomes (Robey et al., 
2008). Despite their contribution, Fur-
neaux and Wade’s (2011) research offers a 
one-sided perspective that only provides 
a partial understanding of IOS discontin-
uance, since at least two and sometimes 
more companies are involved in IOS use 
(Bala and Venkatesh, 2007). Our study 
thus contributes to the existing literature 
by giving further insights into IOS dis-
continuance. We demonstrate that the 
gap between IT characteristics and user 
expectations (Furneaux and Wade, 2011) 
partially explains ORA discontinuance. 
We also identify other triggers that affect 
both buyers and suppliers. More partic-
ularly, we show the extent to which buy-
ers’ opportunism can trigger suppliers’ 
discontinuance, since users can deflect 
its application through their ongoing in-
teraction with the technology (Griffith, 
1999). Moreover, we demonstrate that 
even though the ORA design is largely 
in favor of buyers, some of them have 
surprisingly decided to stop using the 
technology. This discontinuance can be 
explained by the perceived risks related 
to ORA use due to control mechanisms 
and penalties that outweigh the expected 
benefits in our case. By regulating the use 
of ORAs, the legislator introduced con-
trols and tough sanctions, creating new 
risks that outweigh the supposed gains 
to be had from embracing ORAs. Thus, 
even though the IT features correspond 
to user expectations (Furneaux and Wade, 
2011), and buyers are generally satisfied 
with the outcomes of their use of ORAs 
(Bhattacherjee and Prekumar, 2004), 
some have decided to stop holding them 
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in view of the risks brought about by 
changes to the institutional context. 
Few studies have looked at the role 
of perceived risk that may curb initial 
adoption (Featherman and Pavlou, 2003; 
Pavlou, 2003). Featherman and Pavlou 
(2003) showed the extent to which “per-
formance-based risk perceptions” can 
deter initial adoption in the context of 
e-commerce. This performance-based 
risk reflects the product’s failure to de-
liver the expected performance. In the 
present paper, we examine the perceived 
risk of a transgressor (buyer) paying a 
high price through controls and sanc-
tions imposed by the law in the case of 
IT misuse. We thus contribute to the IS 
literature by demonstrating the extent to 
which perceived risk constitutes a barrier 
to IT use, offsetting user satisfaction and 
even leading to discontinuance. 
CONCLUSION
Our study makes several contributions 
to the IS literature. Along with previous 
studies (e.g., Venkatesh and Bala, 2008), 
we show the limitations of studying a focal 
firm to understand IOS use. Since the latter 
is embedded in a network of relationships 
with different partners, it is important to 
have a multi-stakeholder perspective when 
examining adoption and use. We demon-
strate the need to take the perspectives 
of both buyers and suppliers on board in 
order to understand the determinants of 
IOS use from the vantage point of the focal 
firm as well as the trading partner. In ef-
fect, focusing on the focal firm alone offers 
only partial understanding of the enablers 
and barriers to ORA use. 
While IS research tends to focus on re-
quired capabilities that facilitate IOS use 
(Chwelos et al., 2001, Robey et al., 2008; 
Rai and Tang, 2010), we show that having 
to renounce capabilities also constitutes 
a barrier to ORA use. Thus, we urge re-
searchers to examine not only the organi-
zational capabilities needed for IS use, but 
also those that may be abandoned.  
Our study gives further insights into the 
role of the institutional context in that it 
can influence determinants of use by cre-
ating new barriers which actually inhibit 
IT use. We show the extent to which the 
risks related to sanctions and controls im-
posed by this institutional context consti-
tute a barrier to use and can potentially 
trigger ORA discontinuance.  
To conclude, our results provide valu-
able insights into ORA use that go beyond 
the perceived outcomes of ORAs by con-
sidering both organizational capabilities 
and changes in the institutional context. 
Unlike previous studies (e.g., Rodon et 
al., 2011), we show that intervention can 
have unexpected outcomes and can even 
lead to IT discontinuance. Moreover, our 
findings indicate the need to consider IT 
discontinuance in other ways than simply 
through the lens of the disconfirmation 
of expected outcomes (Bhattacherjee and 
Premkumar, 2004), since we identified 
two other forms of IT discontinuance. 
The first was triggered by the opportunis-
tic behavior of buyers, while the second is 
related to perceived risk subsequent to a 
new law being introduced. 
Our study also has some limitations 
however. Controls and sanctions imposed 
by the law are more compelling than 
other forms of intervention. This explains 
the extent to which such related risks can 
outweigh the perceived benefits of an IT 
use. This risk may not be as dissuasive in 
the case of other forms of intervention. 
Future research could examine the extent 
to which other types of intervention may 
impact on determinants of use. Generally, 
IS research has focused on the impact of a 
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single intervention. Following the recom-
mendations of Jasperson et al. (2005), we 
urge future researchers to examine the 
impact of a range of forms of intervention 
on the determinants of use.  
From a managerial perspective, man-
agers should pay careful attention to the 
potential threat arising from any per-
ceived IT-related risk since it might hin-
der IT use should the cost of using the 
system outweigh the initially anticipated 
benefits. Moreover, managers need to be 
dissuasive when introducing regulations 
designed to deal with abusive use. In this 
sense, research has shown the limitations 
of codes of conduct used to tackle op-
portunism, as they are restricted to the 
enunciation of general and non-binding 
statements which fail to discourage users 
from abusing the IT (Harrington, 1996; 
Bush et al., 2010). Thus, careful consid-
eration should be given to the introduc-
tion of controls and penalty mechanisms 
since, while they can be dissuasive as we 
showed in this paper, they may simulta-
neously have unexpected outcomes and 
lead to IT discontinuance when their per-
ceived inconveniences eclipse the per-
ceived benefits. 
REFERENCES
Bakos, J. Y. (1997), “Reducing buyer search 
costs: Implications for electronic mar-
ketplaces”, Management science, vol. 4, 
n°12, p.1676-1692.
Bala, H., & Venkatesh, V. (2007), “Assimila-
tion of interorganizational business pro-
cess standards”. Information systems re-
search, vol. 18, n°3, p.340-362.
Baraldi, E., Gressetvold, E., & Harrison, D. 
(2012), “Resource interaction in inter-orga-
nizational networks: Foundations, compar-
ison, and a research agenda”, Journal of 
Business Research, vol. 65, n°2, p. 266-276.
Benbasat, I., Goldstein, D. K., & Mead, M. 
(1987), “The case research strategy in 
studies of information systems, MIS quar-
terly, vol 11, n°3, p.369-386.
Bhattacherjee, A. (2001), “Understanding 
information systems continuance: an 
expectation-confirmation model”. MIS 
quarterly, vol. 25, n°3, p.351-370.
Bhattacherjee, A., & Premkumar, G. (2004), 
“Understanding changes in belief and at-
titude toward information technology us-
age: a theoretical model and longitudinal 
test”, MIS quarterly, vol. 28, n°2, p.229-
254.
Boukef , N. , Josserand, E., & Charki, M. 
H. (2011), “ Analyse des interprétations 
d’un SIIO en post-adoption et effets sur 
l’usage: jeux de discours et stratégies de 
contournement »,  Systèmes d’informa-
tion & management, vol 16, n°3, p. 7-44.
Bush, V., Bush A.J., and Orr L. (2010), “Moni-
toring the ethical use of sales technology: 
An exploratory field investigation”, Journal 
of Business Ethics, vol. 95, n°2,p. 239-257.
Caby-Guillet, L., Clergeau, C., de Corbière, 
F., Dominguez, C., & Rowe, F. (2007), 
“Perceived Value and Types of Electronic 
Marketplaces in the French Retail Indus-
try: 5 Case Studies”, Communications of 
the Association for Information Systems, 
vol 20, n°1, p.71-101.
Carter, C. R., & Kaufmann, L. (2007), “ The 
impact of electronic reverse auctions on 
supplier performance: the mediating 
role of relationship variables”,  Journal of 
Supply Chain Management, vol 43, n°1, 
p.16-26.
Carter, C. R., Kaufmann, L. Beall, S. Carter, 
P. L., Hendrick, T. E., and Petersen, K. J. 
(2004), “Reverse Auctions: Grounded 
Theory from the Buyer and Supplier Per-
spective,” Transportation Research, vol. 
40, n°3, p. 229–254.
Cecez-Kecmanovic, D., Kautz, K., & Abrahall, 
R. (2014). “Reframing Success and Failure 
07-37 Boukef.indd   29 12/07/16   17:27
23
Boukef et al.: Understanding Online Reverse Auction Determinants of Use: A Multi
Published by AIS Electronic Library (AISeL), 2016
SYSTÈMES D’INFORMATION ET MANAGEMENT
30
of Information Systems: A Performative 
Perspective”, MIS Quarterly, vol 38, n°2, 
p.561-588.
Chang, S. (2007), “Reverse Electronic Auc-
tions: Cases in Taiwan’s High-Tech Indus-
try,” Technology in Society, vol. 29, n°4, p. 
490–496.
Chaparro-Peláez, J., Pereira-Rama, A., & 
Pascual-Miguel, F. J. (2014), “Inter-orga-
nizational information systems adoption 
for service innovation in building sector”, 
Journal of Business Research, vol. 67, 
n°5, p. 673-679.
Charki, M. H., & Josserand, E. (2008), “ On-
line reverse auctions and the dynamics of 
trust”, Journal of management informa-
tion systems, vol 24, n°4, p.175-197.
Charki, M. H., Josserand, E., & Charki, N. B. 
(2011), “Toward an ethical understanding 
of the controversial technology of online 
reverse auctions”,  Journal of Business 
ethics, Vol 98, n°1, p.17-37.
Chwelos, P., Benbasat, I., & Dexter, A. S. 
(2001), “ Research report: Empirical test 
of an EDI adoption model”, Information 
systems research, vol. 12, n°3, p. 304-321.
Cooper, R. B., & Zmud, R. W. (1990). “In-
formation technology implementation 
research: a technological diffusion ap-
proach“, Management science, vol. 36, 
n°2, p.123-139.
Cousins, P. D., & Spekman, R. (2003), “Stra-
tegic supply and the management of 
inter-and intra-organisational relation-
ships“, Journal of Purchasing and Supply 
Management, vol. 9, n°1, p.19-29.
Da Silveira, G.J. and Cagliano R. (2006), “The 
relationship between interorganizational 
information systems and operations per-
formance.”, International Journal of 
Operations & Production Management, 
vol 26, n°3, p. 232-253.
Daly, S. P., & Nath, P. (2005), “Reverse auc-
tions for relationship marketers“, Indus-
trial Marketing Management, vol. 34, 
n°2, p.157-166.
Davis, F. D., Bagozzi, R. P., & Warshaw, P. R. 
(1989), “User acceptance of computer 
technology: a comparison of two theoret-
ical models“, Management science, vol. 
35, n°8, p.982-1003.
Dubé, L., & Paré, G. (2003),”Rigor in infor-
mation systems positivist case research: 
current practices, trends, and recommen-
dations”,  MIS quarterly, vol 27, n°4, p. 
597-636.
Eisenhardt, K., and Bourgeois, L. J. (1988), 
“Politics of Strategic Decision Making in 
High Velocity Environments: Toward a 
Mid-Range Theory“, Academy of Manage-
ment Journal, vol. 31, n°4, p. 737-70.
Ellram, L. M. (1996), “The use of the case study 
method in logistics research“, Journal of 
business logistics, vol. 17, n°2, p.93-138.
Emiliani M.L. (2000), “Business-to-business 
online auctions: key issues for purchas-
ing process improvement“, Supply Chain 
Management, vol. 5, n°4, p.176-186.
Emiliani M. L., and Stec, D. J. (2004), “Aero-
space Parts Suppliers’ Reaction to Online 
Reverse Auctions“, Supply Chain Man-
agement, vol. 9, n°2, p. 139-53.
Emiliani, M.L. (2005), “Regulating B2B on-
line reverse auctions through voluntary 
codes of conduct”, Industrial Marketing 
Management, vol. 34, n°5, p. 526–534.
Emiliani M. L., and Stec, D.J. (2005), “Wood 
Pallet Suppliers’ Reaction to Online Re-
verse Auctions”, Supply Chain Manage-
ment, vol. 10, n°4, p. 278 – 287.
Featherman, M. S., & Pavlou, P. A. (2003), 
“Predicting e-services adoption: a per-
ceived risk facets perspective”, Interna-
tional journal of human-computer stud-
ies, vol. 59, n°4, p. 451-474.
Fichman, R. G., & Kemerer, C. F. (1997). 
“The assimilation of software process in-
novations: An organizational learning per-
07-37 Boukef.indd   30 12/07/16   17:27
24
Systèmes d'Information et Management, Vol. 21 [2016], Iss. 1, Art. 2
http://aisel.aisnet.org/sim/vol21/iss1/2
UNDERSTANDING ONLINE REVERSE AUCTION DETERMINANTS OF USE: A MULTI-STAKEHOLDER CASE STUDY 
31
spective”. Management Science, vol. 43, 
n°10, p. 1345-1363.
Furneaux, B., & Wade, M. (2011), “An Explo-
ration of Organizational Level Information 
Systems Discontinuance Intentions”, MIS 
Quarterly, vol. 35, n°3, p. 573-598.
Gartner Research, by Wilson, D. (2013), 
“Evaluating Sourcing Solution Functional-
ity and Related Vendor Services.”
Giampietro, C., and Emiliani, M. L. (2007), 
“Coercion and Reverse Auctions”, Supply 
Chain Management, vol. 12, n°2, p. 75-84.
Grewal, D., Munger, J. L., Iyer, G. R., and 
Levy, M. (2003), “The Influence of Inter-
net-Retailing Factors on Price Expecta-
tions”, Psychology and Marketing, vol. 
20, n°6, p. 477-491.
Griffith, T. L. (1999), “Technology features 
as triggers for sensemaking”, Academy of 
Management review, vol. 24, n°3, p.472-
488.
Gulati, R., & Sytch, M. (2007),”Dependence 
asymmetry and joint dependence in in-
terorganizational relationships: effects 
of embeddedness on a manufacturer’s 
performance in procurement relation-
ships”, Administrative Science Quar-
terly, vol. 52, n°1, p. 32-69.
Handfield, R., Straight, S., and Stirling, W. 
(2002), “Reverse Auctions: How do Sup-
ply Managers Really Feel About Them?”, 
Inside Supply Management, vol. 13, n°11, 
p. 56-61.
Hannon, D. (2003), “Purchasing survey 
shows e-sourcing adoption stalls”, Pur-
chasing Magazine, vol. 132, n° 12, p. 
49−51.
Harrington, S. J. (1996), “The effect of codes 
of ethics and personal denial of responsi-
bility on computer abuse judgments and 
intentions.” MIS quarterly, vol. 20, n°3, 
p. 257-278.
Hart, P., & Saunders, C. (1997), “Power 
and trust: Critical factors in the adop-
tion and use of electronic data inter-
change”, Organization science, vol. 8, 
n°1, p.23-42.
Hawkins, T. G., Randall, W. S., Coyne, A. V., 
& Baitalmal, M. H. (2014), “Sustainable in-
tegrity: how reverse auctions can benefit 
suppliers in emerging markets”, Supply 
Chain Management: An International 
Journal, vol. 19, n°2, p.126-141.
Hur, D., Mabert, V. A., and Hartley, J. L. 
(2007), “Getting the Most out of Reverse 
E-Auction Investment,” Omega, vol. 35, 
n°4, p. 403-416.
Iacovou, C. L., Benbasat, I., & Dexter, A. S. 
(1995),”Electronic data interchange and 
small organizations: adoption and impact 
of technology”, MIS quarterly, vol. 19, 
n°4, p.465-485.
Ivory (2014), “’Reverse Auction’s Draw 
scrutiny”, New York Times, http://www.
nytimes.com/2014/04/07/business/re-
verse-auctions-draw-scrutiny.html
Jap, S. D. (2001), “Perspectives on joint 
competitive advantages in buyer–supplier 
relationships”, International Journal of 
Research in Marketing, vol. 18, n°1, p. 
19-35.
Jap, S.D. (2002), “Online reverse auctions: 
issues, themes, and prospects for the fu-
ture”, Journal of the Academy of Market-
ing Science, vol. 30, n°4, p. 506-525.
Jap, S.D. (2003), “An exploratory study of 
the introduction of online reverse auc-
tions”, Journal of Marketing, vol. 67, n°3, 
p. 96-108.
Jap, S. D. (2007), “The Impact of Online Re-
verse Auction Design on Buyer-Supplier 
Relationships.” Journal of Marketing, vol. 
71, n°1, p. 146-159.
Jap, S. D., & Haruvy, E. (2008), “Interorgani-
zational relationships and bidding behav-
ior in industrial online reverse auctions”. 
Journal of Marketing Research, vol45, 
n°5, p.550-561.
07-37 Boukef.indd   31 12/07/16   17:27
25
Boukef et al.: Understanding Online Reverse Auction Determinants of Use: A Multi
Published by AIS Electronic Library (AISeL), 2016
SYSTÈMES D’INFORMATION ET MANAGEMENT
32
Jasperson, J., Carter, P. E., and Zmud, R. 
(2005), “A Comprehensive Conceptual-
ization of Post-Adoptive Behaviors Asso-
ciated with Information Technology En-
abled Work Systems,” MIS Quarterly, vol. 
29, n°3, p. 525-557.
Johnston, H. R., & Vitale, M. R. (1988), “Cre-
ating competitive advantage with interor-
ganizational information systems”. MIS 
Quarterly, vol. 12, n°2, p.153-165.
Kurnia, S., & Johnston, R. B. (2000), “The 
need for a processual view of inter-orga-
nizational systems adoption”, The Journal 
of Strategic Information Systems, vol. 9, 
n°4, p.295-319.
Lamb, R., and Kling, R. (2003), “Reconceptu-
alizing Users as Social Actors in Informa-
tion Systems Research,” MIS Quarterly, 
vol. 27, n°2, p. 197-235.
Lee, Y., Kozar, K. A., & Larsen, K. R. (2003),” 
The technology acceptance model: Past, 
present, and future. Communications of 
the Association for information systems, 
vol. 12, n°1, p.752-780.
Legris, P., Ingham, J., & Collerette, P. (2003). 
“Why do people use information technol-
ogy? A critical review of the technology 
acceptance model”. Information & man-
agement, vol. 40, n°3, p.191-204. 
McAfee, R. P., & McMillan, J. (1987), “Auc-
tions and bidding”,  Journal of economic 
literature, vol 25, n°2, p.699-738.
Meier,  J.,  (1995), “The  importance  of  re-
lationship  management  in  establishing 
successful  interorganizational  systems”, 
The  Journal  of  Strategic  Information 
Systems, vol. 4, n°2, p. 135-148.
Miles, M. B., and Huberman, A. M.(1994), 
Qualitative Data Analyses. Sage Publica-
tions.
Mithas, S., Jones, J. L., & Mitchell, W. (2008, 
“Buyer intention to use internet-enabled 
reverse auctions: the role of asset speci-
ficity, product specialization, and non-
contractibility. MIS quarterly, vol. 32, n°4, 
p.705-724. 
Mukhopadhyay T, Kekre S, Kalathur S. 
(1995), “Business Value of Information 
Technology: A Study of Electronic Data 
Interchange”, MIS Quarterly, vol. 19, n°2, 
p.137-156.
Orlikowski, W., and Iacono, S. C. (2001), “Re-
search commentary: Desperately Seeking 
the “IT” in IT Research: A Call to Theoriz-
ing the IT artifact”, Information Systems 
Research, vol. 12, n°2, p.121-134. 
Palmatier, R. W., Dant, R. P., & Grewal, 
D. (2007), “A comparative longitudinal 
analysis of theoretical perspectives of 
interorganizational relationship perfor-
mance”, Journal of marketing, vol. 71, 
n°4, p.172-194.
Patton, M. (2002), Qualitative Research and 
Evaluation Methods, 3rd ed. Thousand 
Oaks: Sage.
Pavlou, P. A. (2003), “Consumer acceptance 
of electronic commerce: Integrating trust 
and risk with the technology acceptance 
model”, International journal of elec-
tronic commerce, vol. 7, n°3, p. 101-134.
Pettigrew, A. M. (1992), “The Character 
and Significance of Strategy Process Re-
search,” Strategic Management Journal, 
vol. 13, p. 5-16.
Pinker, E. J., Seidmann, A., & Vakrat, Y. 
(2003), “Managing online auctions: Cur-
rent business and research issues”, Man-
agement Science, vol. 49, n°11, p.1457-
1484.
Premkumar, G., Ramamurthy, K., & Crum, 
M. (1997). Determinants of EDI adoption 
in the transportation industry. European 
Journal of Information Systems, vol. 6, 
n°2, p. 107-121.
Rai, A., & Tang, X. (2010), “Leveraging IT 
capabilities and competitive process capa-
bilities for the management of interorga-
nizational relationship portfolios”, Infor-
07-37 Boukef.indd   32 12/07/16   17:27
26
Systèmes d'Information et Management, Vol. 21 [2016], Iss. 1, Art. 2
http://aisel.aisnet.org/sim/vol21/iss1/2
UNDERSTANDING ONLINE REVERSE AUCTION DETERMINANTS OF USE: A MULTI-STAKEHOLDER CASE STUDY 
33
mation Systems Research, vol. 21, n°3, p. 
516-542.
Rai, A., Patnayakuni, R., & Seth, N. (2006), 
“Firm performance impacts of digitally 
enabled supply chain integration capabili-
ties”. MIS quarterly, vol. 30, n°2, p.225-246.
Rajaguru, R. and Matanda, M.J. (2013), “Ef-
fects of inter-organizational compatibility 
on supply chain capabilities: Exploring 
the mediating role of interorganizational 
information systems (IOIS) integration”, 
Industrial Marketing Management, Vol. 
42 No. 4, p. 620-632.
Reimers, K., Johnston, R. B., & Klein, S. 
(2014),”An empirical evaluation of exist-
ing IS change theories for the case of IOIS 
evolution”, European Journal of Infor-
mation Systems, vol. 23, n°4, p. 373-399.
Richards, L. (1999), Using NVivo in Qualita-
tive Research. Bundoora, Victoria, Austra-
lia
Riggins, F. J., & Mukhopadhyay, T. (1994),” 
Interdependent benefits from interorga-
nizational systems: opportunities for busi-
ness partner reengineering”, Journal of 
management information systems, vol. 
11, n°2, p.37-57.
Robey, D., Im, G., & Wareham, J. D. (2008), 
“Theoretical foundations of empirical re-
search on interorganizational systems: 
assessing past contributions and guiding 
future directions”,  Journal of the Associ-
ation for Information Systems, vol. 9, n°9, 
p. 497-518.
Rodon, J., Sese, F., & Christiaanse, E. (2011), 
“Exploring users’ appropriation and post 
implementation managerial intervention 
in the context of industry IOIS”, Informa-
tion Systems Journal, vol. 21, n°3, p.223-
248.
Smart A., and Harrison, A. (2003), “Online 
Reverse Auctions and Their Role in Buyer-
Supplier Relationships,” Journal of Pur-
chasing and Supply Management, vol. 9, 
n°5/6, p. 257-268.
Smeltzer, L. R., & Carr, A. (2002), “Reverse 
auctions in industrial marketing and buy-
ing. Business Horizons, vol. 45, n° 2, p.47-
52.
Smeltzer, L. R., & Carr, A. S. (2003), “Elec-
tronic reverse auctions: Promises, risks 
and conditions for success”. Industrial 
Marketing Management, vol. 32, n°6, 
p.481-488.
Soh, C., & Markus, M. L. (2002), “B2B E-mar-
ket places–interconnection effects, strate-
gic positioning, and performance”. Syste-
mes d’information et Management, vol 7, 
n° 1, p.77-103.
Soh, C., Markus, M. L., & Goh, K. H. (2006), 
“Electronic marketplaces and price trans-
parency: strategy, information technology, 
and success”, MIS quarterly, vol 30, n°3, 
p. 705-723
Standing, S., Standing, C., Love, P., & Gen-
gatharen, D. (2013), “ How organizing vi-
sions influence the adoption and use of 
reverse auctions”,  Electronic Commerce 
Research, vol 13, n°4, p. 493-511.
Swanson, E. B., & Ramiller, N. C. (1997), 
“The organizing vision in information sys-
tems innovation”, Organization science, 
vol. 8, n°5, p.458-474.
Tassabehji, R., W.A. Taylor, R. Beach & A. 
Wood (2006), “Reverse e-auctions and 
supplier-buyer relationships: an explor-
atory study”, International Journal of 
Operations & Production Management, 
vol. 26, n°2, p. 166-184.
Teo, H. H., Wei, K. K., & Benbasat, I. (2003), 
“Predicting intention to adopt interor-
ganizational linkages: An institutional 
perspective”. MIS quarterly, vol. 27, n°1, 
p.19-49.
Van Offenbeek, M., Boonstra, A., & Seo, D. 
(2013), “Towards integrating acceptance 
and resistance research: evidence from 
a telecare case study”, European Jour-
nal of Information Systems, vol. 22, n°4, 
p.434-454.
07-37 Boukef.indd   33 12/07/16   17:27
27
Boukef et al.: Understanding Online Reverse Auction Determinants of Use: A Multi
Published by AIS Electronic Library (AISeL), 2016
SYSTÈMES D’INFORMATION ET MANAGEMENT
34
Venkatesh, V., Morris, M. G., Davis, G. B., & Da-
vis, F. D. (2003), “User acceptance of infor-
mation technology: Toward a unified view”, 
MIS quarterly, vol 27, n°3, p.425-478.
Venkatesh, V. & Bala, H. (2008), “Technology 
acceptance model 3 and research agenda 
on interventions”, Decision sciences, 
vol.39, n°2, p.273-315. 
Venkatesh, V., Thong, J. Y., & Xu, X. (2012). 
“Consumer acceptance and use of infor-
mation technology: extending the unified 
theory of acceptance and use of technol-
ogy”, MIS quarterly, vol. 36, n°1, p.157-178.
Wagner, S. M., & Schwab, A. P. (2004), “Set-
ting the stage for successful electronic 
reverse auctions.” Journal of Purchasing 
and Supply Management, vol. 10, n°1, 
p. 11-26.
Wang, Y.Y. (2014), “Understanding the role 
of Interorganizational Systems (IOS) char-
acteristics on Supply chain integration”, 
Proceedings of the 20th Americas confer-
ence on information systems, Savannah, 
USA.
Williams, J. A., & Dobie, K. (2011), “Elec-
tronic Reverse Auctions: Integrating an E-
Sourcing Tool into a Sales and Purchasing 
Cross-Course Negotiation Project”, Mar-
keting Education Review, vol. 21, n°1, 
p.35-42.
Yin, R. K. 2013. Case Study Research: Design 
and Methods. Thousand Oaks: Sage.
07-37 Boukef.indd   34 12/07/16   17:27
28
Systèmes d'Information et Management, Vol. 21 [2016], Iss. 1, Art. 2
http://aisel.aisnet.org/sim/vol21/iss1/2
UNDERSTANDING ONLINE REVERSE AUCTION DETERMINANTS OF USE: A MULTI-STAKEHOLDER CASE STUDY 
35
APPENDIX A: INTERVIEW GUIDE
IT initiators Buyers Suppliers
ORA use 
enablers
Could you explain the 
reasons you put for-
ward to convince buy-
ers and suppliers to use 
ORAs?
Why do you use ORAs? 
What are you look-
ing for when you use 
ORAs? 
Why do you use ORAs? 
What are you look-




How do you interpret 
the problems related to 
ORA use?
Have you faced or have 
you heard about any 
problems related to 
ORA use?
How do you interpret 
the problems? How can 
these problems impact 
on your use of ORAs? 
Why?
Have you faced or have 
you heard about any 
problems related to 
ORA use?
How do you interpret 
these problems? How 
can these problems 
impact on your use of 
ORAs? Why?
The impact 
of the new 
law on use
How do you interpret 
the new law? Do you 
think that it has im-
proved ORA use?
Do you think that it has 
redressed the climate 
of distrust that prevails 
between buyers and 
suppliers? How?
How do you interpret 
the new law? Do you 
think that it has im-
proved your ORA use? 
How? 
Has it remedied the 
climate of distrust that 
prevailed between you 
and suppliers? How? 
How do you interpret 
the new law? Do you 
think that it has im-
proved your ORA use? 
How?
Has it remedied the 
climate of distrust that 
prevailed between you 
and buyers? How? 
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APPENDIX B: SAMPLING LOGIC
Informant 
categories








(phase 1) and four ini-
tiators (phase 2)
This group includes 
stakeholders such as 
the organization and 
B2B project manager 
(our key informant), 
Electronic Marketplace 
managers, an ORA co-
ordinator, Information 
Systems director, gen-
eral manager of B2B 
relationships
The initiators of the 
technology, including 
our key informant, have 
a significant material in-
terest in the IOS since 
they are responsible for 
sourcing, identifying 
and promoting its use 
(buyers and suppliers 
in this context). The 
more that buyers and 
suppliers use the tech-
nology, the more this 
group is effective. 
 
The role of the technol-
ogy initiators is to pro-
mote, persuade, assist 
and support the use 
of all IOS (including 




ers (phase 1) and 
twenty-nine buyers 
(phase 2) 
Buyers constitute the 
group who theoreti-
cally benefit the most 
from the use of this 
IOS. The initiators of 
the technology pre-
sented it as a significant 




are the first group to 
decide on the use of 
the IOS. While the re-
tailer’s management 
team adopted the IOS, 
it decided that the buy-
ers should be free to 
decide the extent to 
which they use the IOS 
or not. 
Suppliers Thirty-two suppliers 
(phase 1) and twen-
ty-two suppliers (phase 
2)
Suppliers constitute 
the users to whom the 
initiators of the tech-
nology needed to pro-
mote the theoretical 
advantages of the use 
of the IOS, such as new 




are free to decide with 
the buyers who already 
use the IOS the extent 
to which they use it or 
not.  
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Transparency Carter et al. (2004)
Improved buyer performance Jap (2003)
Extended sourcing horizons Daly & Nath (2005)
Opportunity to penetrate new mar-
kets
Emiliani (2000)
Benchmarking against competitors Daly & Nath (2005)
Barriers to 
ORA use 
Fear of losing control over the pur-
chasing process
Jap (2003)
Competition with the system Emergent
Buyer’s opportunism Jap (2003)
Climate of distrust Carter et al. (2004)
Capabilities
Capacity to select suppliers up front 
and write request for quotation. 
Emergent
E-sourcing technology and supplier 
databases
Emergent
Existing skills such as negotiation, 
quick response and innovation be-
come redundant for competition
Emergent
Enablers and/or barriers 
arising from  
the new law
Suppliers’ reluctance to call for con-
trols
Emergent
The law failed to put an end to dis-
trust
Emergent
The law can be bypassed Emergent
Risk of controls and sanctions dis-
suade buyers from using ORAs
Emergent
ORA use complicated because of the 
law
Emergent
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